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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD 1 
PATRICIA 
vs. 
R. BLACK, D 
BLACK, 
Plaintiffs 
DR. JAMES S. BOYCE, 
Defendant 
.D.S 
and 
and 
. and ) 
Appellants, ) 
Respondent. ) 
Case No. 14358 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages brought by the buyers 
of corporate stock against the seller for an illegal sale 
of the stock which was the subject matter of the buyers1 
conditional sales agreement contrary to the requirements 
of the Utah law on recission of contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From a verdict for 
the defendant of no cause of action the plaintiffs appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek to have the judgment of the Trial 
Court reversed and a new trial granted to determine plaintiffs1 
damages from the wrongful sale of the purchased stock. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In August, 1961, the plaintiffs and the defend-
ant, together with one, Doctor E. Wayne Allrou, purchased 
a property fronting on State Street in Orem, Utah. The 
property had formerly been a motel and had an approximate 
size of three and one-half acres. (Tr. 4) After acquisi-
tion the owners of the property incorporated under the 
name of Orem Professional Plaza, Inc. and issued 90 
shares of stock, 30 shares to each of them. (Tr. 6 
lines 7-11) They then transferred all of the property to 
the corporation. (Tr. 14 lines 2-9) Each of the three 
owners established their professional offices in separate 
suites in the former motel property. In 196^ the defend-
ant moved his dental practice to the State of California 
(Tr. 6 lines 25-27) and in 1964 negotiated to sell plain-
tiffs his 30 shares of stock in Orem Professional Plaza, 
Inc. (Tr. 6 lines 28-30) On June 4, 1964, the defendant 
forwarded a letter consummating the transaction (ex. 4) 
and a letter of resignation (Ex. 5) as officer and direct-
or of the corporation. (Tr. 7 lines 20-25) No formal 
agreement was prepared for the stock purchase, but the 
plaintiffs executed a promissory note for $3,34 3.20 (Ex. 
2) (Tr. 8 lines 4-9 and Tr. 8 lines 25-30) The defendant, 
seller of the stock, retained possession of the stock 
-2-
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certificates, the parties agreeing by their testimony that" the 
stock was to be transferred upon completion of payment. (Tr. 
64 lines 3-7 and 23-30) The plaintiffs made irregular payments 
to the defendant on the promissory note through May 13, 1967. 
(Ex. 7) (Tr. 9 lines 3-7) In 1964 four payments were made, in 
1965 two payments, two in 1966, and in 1967 three, all of 
different and varying amounts. (Ex. 7) By February 28, 1967 
plaintiffs had made advance payments of $102.02, more than 
required by the terms of the promissory note. By May 13, 
1967, they were $45.46 paid in advance. By July 7, 1967, 
according to the terms of the promissory note thev were $65.93 
in arrears. On July 7, 1967, the defendant claimed to have 
sent a letter to the Plaintiff, Richard R. Black, but not 
addressed to the Plaintiff, Patricia Black, the other purchaser 
(Ex. 8) (Tr. 17 lines 26^0, Tr. 18 lines 19-29) Tne letter was 
never received by the plaintiffs. (Tr. 29 lines 16-21) There-
after, on December 6, 1967, the defendant received a letter 
from the plaintiffs (Ex. 6) together with a check for two 
installments in the sum of $111.76. (Tr. 9 lines 24-20, Tr. 
10 lines 2-7) The letter informed the defendant that the 
plaintiffs would pay two payments monthly and had sold otner 
property by which they, would soon be able to pay the balance 
owing upon the note. The defendant did not respond to the 
letter but banked the payments received wit:: the letter. Z:\ 
August 7, 1967, prior to the receipt of the two installments 
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and the letter of December 5, 1967, the defendant sold 
the 30 shares of stoch to the other stockholders of Crcm 
Professional Plaza for tne then re.fining unpaid bal\nce 
upon the promissory note, (Tr. 13 .lines 17-21) No 
further notice of any kind wai givsn to the plaintiffs. 
:;o notification was given to the plaintiffs after the 
receipt of the two installments and tne letter of December 
6, 1967 which informed the plaintiffs of the- prior sale 
of the stock to the other owners of the Ore:. Professional 
Piaz-, Inc. (Tr. 67 lines i-10) After the letter of 
December 6, 1967 from the plaintiffs to the defendant no 
furthe- communication transferred between them. Tne 
reafter, the other owners of Orem Professional Plaza 
made a demand for rentals and eventually evicted the 
plaintiffs from the Professional Offices. (Ex. 9) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
APPELLANTS MOVED TO CALIFORNIA WHEN, IN FACT, 
THE APPELLANTS REMAINED IN THE PROPERTY BEING 
PURCHASED THROUGH THE ENTIRE CONTRACT 
In the decision rendered by the Supreme Court 
the writer says that the defendants tried to carry out 
the stock transaction after the appellants had left-
Utah and gone to California. The Supreme Court misinterpreted 
-4-
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the parties and concluded that the appellants/buyers of 
the stock had moved to California when, in fact, the records 
show that the defendant/seller moved to California and the 
buyers remained in possession of the premises being purchased. 
At Tr. 6f lines 25-27, appellants1 counsel in questioning 
Defendant, Dr. James S. Boyce, asked: 
Q: "In 196 3 you moved your practice to 
California?" 
A: "Yes." 
The decision went on to conclude that the defendant tried to 
carry out the stock transaction by mail. However, the 
evidence indicates that the correspondence as to failure to 
pay a payment under a promissory note was never received. 
The documents in issue show that the purchase was not a 
stock purchase agreement but a promissory note coupled 
with an oral agreement (Ex. 2, a photocopy of the installment 
note executed by plaintiffs, Dr. Richard Black and Patricia 
Black, in connection with the sale of the stock and the 
testimony of Defendant, Dr. James S. Boyce (Tr. 8, lines 25-30)): 
Q: "Now, Dr. Boyce, were there any other written 
agreement prepared to carry out the sale of 
this 30 shares of Orem Professional Plaza, 
Inc. by yourself to Dr. Black, other than 
the documents that I have presented to the 
Court?. 
A: "None to my knowledge." 
There were no provisions in the installment note for forfeiture 
of the interest of Dr. Black in the stock or for notice. 
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-• ---POINT II _ . 
THE SUPREME COURT MISINTERPRETED THE ACTION AS 
ONE FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WHEN IN FACT IT 
WAS A SUIT FOR DAMAGES 
This Court's ruling assumes this to be an action 
in specific performance. 
Appeal from a Judge - tried case resulting 
in a no cause of action judgment, in a 
specific performance case where the parties 
agreed to buy and sell, on condition, a 
medical facility. Black v. Boyce, Supreme 
Court of Utah Decision filed July 2 7, 19 76 
At the time of the commencement of the action the 
plaintiffs brought suit tentatively for specific performance 
or damages. Prior to the time of trial it was determined by 
discovery that the defendant had previously sold the stock and 
disposed of the stock and, therefore, the only recourse the 
plaintiffs had was a suit for damages. That it was to be 
a suit for damages is shown by statement of defendant's 
counsel. (Tr. 40, lines 9-12) 
Well, of course, he has brought a lawsuit for 
damages, but the record shows, without dispute, 
that he has never tendered performance or 
the monies that were due under the Note. 
POINT III 
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF 
RESCISSION OF THE PURCHASE CONTRACT UNDER UTAH LAW 
WHERE THE DEFENDANT/SELLER OF THE STOCK ELECTED TO 
RESCIND THE CONTRACT AND TO SELL THE STOCK TO OTHERS 
The instant case is not simply one, as the Court 
in its decision stated, "where someone assumes he should 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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be apprised-of his own failure to comply w^ ith the terms 
with respect to payments." The seller moved from the 
State of Utah and thereafter accepted irregular payments 
over a four (4) year period. The buyers sometimes were 
paid ahead and sometimes were in arrears in their payments 
during said period, until May 13, 1967. (Ex. 7; Tr. 9, 
_lines 3-7) The seller had acquiesced in such irregular 
payments. If he then intended to hold the buyers to the 
strict terms of the note, notice of such intent should have been 
communicated. 
The action of the defendant in selling the stock 
without a return of the consideration constitutes a 
forfeiture of the plaintiffs1 rights in the matter. 
As this Court has recently decided in Fullmer v. 
Blood, (1976), 546 P.2d 606: 
. . . When a seller accepts late payments 
which allow a buyer to believe the forfeiture 
provision will not be strictly enforced, 
the court will not enforce it unless notice 
is given and a reasonable time allowed to 
-~
r
 >*— make the delinquencies; and that where the 
"'
 >
 ~-N v- forfeiture of the amount that has been paid 
-, *" in would be so inequitable as to be unconscion-
able the court of equity will refuse to 
enforce it. Malmberg v. Baugh, (1923), 
62 Utah 331, 508 P. 975; Lamont v. Evjen, 
(1973), 29 Utah 2d 266, 508 P.2d 532; 
Paul v. Kitty 544 P.2d 886 (Utah December 
1975) Id.at 609 
Without question, the seller had the right to retain 
the stock until paid and might also have a right to rescind 
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under certain conditions. Section 60-4-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, sets forth the remedies 
of an unpaid seller: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this title, 
notwithstanding that the property in the goods 
may have passed to the buyer, the unpaid 
seller of goods, as such, has: 
(a) A lien on the goods or right to 
retain them for the price while he is 
in possession of them. 
(c) A right of resale as limited by 
this title. 
(d) A right to rescind the sale as 
limited by this title. 
(2) Where the property in goods has not passed 
to the buyer, the unpaid seller has, in addition 
to his other remedies, a right of withholding 
delivery similar to, and coexistensive with, his 
rights of lien and stoppage in transitu where 
the property has passed to the buyer. 
In this case since title had not passed to the buyers (plaintiffs), 
the seller (defendant) had a right of withholding delivery 
until he was paid. ^ 
If the seller elects to rescind, notice, which 
is not only sent to but received by the buyer, would be 
necessarily coupled with the requirement of refund of the 
consideration paid to restore the former status of the 
parties. 
This Court in Perry v. Woodall, (1968), 20 Utah 2d 
299, 438 P.2d 813, at page 401, stated: 
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~ The law is well settled that one electing 
to rescind a contract must tender back to 
the other contracting party whatever 
property of value he has received. 
This was emphasized by the Court in Wingets v. 
Bitters , (1922), 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007: 
In the strict legal or equitable sense, the 
term 'rescission1 imports the concept of 
completely annulling a contract as if it 
had never existed. This includes the idea 
of restoring the parties to their former 
status, and the return by each to the 
other of what had been received under it. 
[emphasis supplied] 
The claimed notice of rescission, although disputed 
as to its receipt, could not constitute a rescission of the 
contract since the requirement of notice of rescission is 
coupled with an obligation to return the consideration or the 
obligation to sell the merchandise (the stock in this case) 
for the best possible price obtainable therefor and credit 
the buyer. Knudsen Music Co. v. Masterson, (1952) 121 Utah 
252, 240 P.2d 1973, 17 Am. Jur. 2d; Peterson v. Hodges, (1951) 
121 Utah 72, 2 39 P.2d 180. The default, if any, of the 
buyers may.absolve the seller from further performance but 
does not give him the right to sell the stock without 
return of the consideration. 
The effects of the Court's decision is to allow the 
defendant to retain the purchase price paid by the buyers 
and also to rescind the contract and resell the stock without 
complying with the rule of law on rescission. 
~Q«. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants herein should be given a rehearing of 
this matter so that the issues presented to the Court on 
appeal can be argued and the Court be given an opportunity 
to redress this wrong and error committed by the trial 
court. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of August, 
1976. 
M. Dayle Je 
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in the United States Mails, postage prepaid, this 16th 
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